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Lactose’s Intolerance 
THE ROLE OF MANUFACTURERS’ RIGHTS AND 
COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH IN BIG DAIRY’S FIGHT 
TO RESTRICT USE OF THE TERM “MILK” 
INTRODUCTION 
A young professional idles in line at their favorite café. 
Morning sunlight spills through the windows, bathing the trendy 
décor in a bright orange opalescence, as a queue of bleary-eyed 
patrons advance, single file toward the counter. The young 
professional reaches the front of the line and approaches the barista 
to place their daily order. “I’d like a Venti Caffè Latte with soymilk, 
please.” “I’m sorry,” the barista responds with feigned enthusiasm, 
“we no longer carry soymilk, but we have soy beverage and almond 
milk imitation.” Disappointed and unfamiliar with the synthetic 
sounding alternatives, the young professional reluctantly amends 
their order to a Caffè Latte with one percent milk. Today, soy, 
coconut, and almond dairy alternatives allow Americans to exact 
control over what they consume, but commonplace product names 
and advertisements may soon become a convenience of the past.1 
Beginning in the 1970s, the prevalence of non-animal-
based substitutes for traditional food products has proliferated 
due to growing concerns over nutrition, health, and animal 
welfare.2 An increase in the number of Americans with dietary 
restrictions, imposed through voluntary constraint and medical 
necessity, also contributed to the augmented popularity and 
pervasiveness of these products.3 As a result, markets for foods 
 
 1 Katie Gates Calderon, Elizabeth Fessler, & Lindsey Heinz, Dairy Vs. Plant-
Based ‘Milks’: A Regulatory Standoff, LAW360 (Aug. 27, 2017, 10:59 AM EDT), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/957097/dairy-vs-plant-based-milks-a-regulatory-
standoff [http://perma.cc/A7UK-Q4Q5]. 
 2 Id.; see also Lauren Sipple, What’s in a Name?: The Use of Dairy Product 
Names in Labeling of Plant-Based Alternatives, SCI. MEETS FOOD (Dec. 13, 2018), 
http://sciencemeetsfood.org/whats-name-use-dairy-product-names-labeling-plant-based-
alternatives/ [https://perma.cc/8S4C-XW43] (“Fluid milk consumption in the United 
States has declined steadily since the 1970s. . . . Meanwhile, non-dairy milk alternative 
sales have grown by over 60% in the last five years, and the dairy alternatives market is 
projected to grow to $19.5 billion by 2020.” (citations omitted)). 
 3 Calderon, et al., supra note 1. In addition to allergies, concerns about a possible 
correlation between dairy products and serious diseases likely contribute to the decline in 
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derived from animals have been subject to pullback, resulting in 
decreased sales and reduced net profits.4 This shift in market 
power served as the catalyst for a twenty-year battle between 
the dairy5 and plant-based alternatives industries over product 
labeling and misrepresentation.6 
The fight began in 1997 when the Soyfoods Association of 
America (SANA)7 filed a citizen’s petition with the United States 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).8 The entreaty requested 
that the Commissioner of the FDA amend Part 102 of U.S. FDA 
regulations to include a subsection specifically recognizing soymilk 
within the section titled “Common or Unusual Name for 
Nonstandardized Foods.”9 The executive agency issued a response 
in which it officially acknowledged receipt of the petition but stated 
that it was unable to address the issue due to its limited budget 
and because it had other, more pressing priorities.10 Notably, the 
FDA neither cautioned manufacturers about possible liability for 
misrepresentation,11 nor did it take any steps toward amending 
 
dairy consumption in the United States. See, e.g., Health Concerns About Dairy, 
PHYSICIANS COMM. FOR RESPONSIBLE MED., https://www.pcrm.org/good-nutrition/
nutrition-information/health-concerns-about-dairy [https://perma.cc/N4FW-PRNM] (“Milk 
and other dairy products are the top source of saturated fat in the American diet, 
contributing to heart disease, type [two] diabetes, and Alzheimer’s disease. Studies have 
also linked dairy to an increased risk of breast, ovarian, and prostate cancers.”). 
 4 Lela Nargi, What’s Behind the Crippling Dairy Crisis? Family Farmers 
Speak Out, CIV. EATS (Nov. 5, 2018), https://civileats.com/2018/11/05/whats-behind-the-
crippling-dairy-crisis-family-farmers-speak-out/ [https://perma.cc/WTX6-8X3S]. 
 5 In this note, “Dairy” and “Big Dairy” refer to interest groups, large scale 
dairy producers, and other influential parties that advocate on behalf of animal milk 
producers. For simplicity, this note concentrates on the National Milk Producers 
Federation (NMPF) and to a lesser extent, on U.S. Dairy Export Counsel (USDEC), and 
International Dairy Foods Association (IDFA). 
 6 See Michael Pellman Rowland, Got Milk? A Tale of Two Cities, FORBES (Apr. 
11, 2017, 12:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpellmanrowland/2017/04/11/
milk-industry-controversy/#1c86e0f057e5 [https://perma.cc/J2Q5-5LZW]; see also 
Calderon, et al., supra note 1. 
 7 The Soyfoods Association of North America (SANA) is an advocacy 
organization focused on “the health benefits and nutritional advantages of soy 
consumption.” About Us, SOYFOODS ASS’N OF NORTH AM., http://www.soyfoods.org/about-
us [https://perma.cc/N27Z-FBGG]. 
 8 FDA-1997-P-0078-0002, Citizen Petition to the FDA from Soyfoods Ass’n of 
Am. (Feb. 28, 1997), http://www.soyfoods.org/wp-content/uploads/SANA-Citizen-
Petition-No.-97P-0078-2-28-97.pdf [http://perma.cc/XML6-YR36] [hereinafter SANA 
Citizen Petition]. “Citizens petition” refers to a process through which individuals and 
community organizations request that the FDA, or another administrative agency, begin 
a rule-making to alter or create rules and regulations. 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.30–10.31 (2018). 
 9 Sana Citizen Petition, supra note 8, at 1–2. 
 10 Interim Response Letter from F. Edward Scarbrough, Dir., Ctr. for Food 
Safety & Applied Nutrition, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Peter Golbitz, Comm. Chair, 
Soyfoods Ass’n of Am. (Aug. 4, 1997), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?
documentId=FDA-1997-P-0016-0013&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://
perma.cc/T96W-SMSZ] [hereinafter 1997 Scarbrough Interim Response Letter]. 
 11 Upon receipt of the petition, the FDA could have concluded that companies 
using “milk” in product names and labels were liable for misrepresentation under 21 
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regulations so as to restrict use of the word “milk.”12 Although 
seemingly innocuous, the dairy industry quickly viewed the FDA’s 
dismissive response as highly disruptive.13 
The FDA’s failure to give specific instructions opened the 
proverbial floodgates to further confrontations between interest 
groups for the dairy industry and their alternative product 
counterparts. The National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF),14 
SANA, and other interest groups sent letters, taking positions on 
issues similar to those addressed the original petition, to the 
FDA.15 Despite growing interest, the FDA again failed to offer 
guidance to clarify its position on the matter.16 
The continued strain between the dairy and plant-based 
alternative industries, coupled with public backlash from 
consumers purporting to be misled as to the comparability and 
health benefits of switching from animal to plant based dairy 
products, caused industry leaders to look beyond the FDA and 
 
U.S.C.A § 343(c), which states “[i]f it is an imitation of another food, [the product 
manufacturer is liable for misrepresentation] unless its label bears . . . the word 
‘imitation’ and, immediately thereafter, the name of the food imitated.” 21 U.S.C. § 343(c) 
(2012). Most alternative milk products do not include the word “imitation” in their title, 
but rather qualify the term with an alternative food item, followed by the word “milk.” 
See, e.g., The Many Flavors of Progress. Taste ‘em All., SILK (2019), https://silk.com/plant-
based-products/ [https://perma.cc/J8P7-9XEP].  
 12 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 131.110 (2018). 
 13 Letter from Robert D. Byrne, V.P. of Reg. Affairs, Nat’l Milk Prod. Fed’n, to 
Joseph A. Levitt, Dir. of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, 2 (Feb. 14, 2000), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-
2017-P-1298-0092 [https://perma.cc/Z888-CL8L] [hereinafter 2000 Byrne Letter] 
(included as Attachment 11 re Comment from National Milk Producers Federation). 
 14 NMPF is a special interest organization advocating on behalf of dairy producers 
and the United States milk industry in Washington D.C. See News Release, National Milk 
Producers Federation, Dairy Organizations Applaud Congressional Letter to the FDA Asking 
for Stricter Enforcement of Milk Labeling Standards (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.nmpf.org/
latest-news/press-releases/dec-2016/dairy-organizations-applaud-congressional-letter-fda-
asking [https://perma.cc/H6F2-MM4V] [hereinafter NMPF News Release]. 
 15 Letter from Nancy Chapman, Exec. Dir., Soyfoods Association of North 
America, to Joseph A. Levitt, Dir. of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, at *9–12 (Mar. 9, 2000), http://f.datasrvr.com/fr1/
117/64796/soyfoods_2nd_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/GCQ3-ESVH] [hereinafter 2000 
Chapman Letter] (Including Appendix with letters from various organizations, including 
the Dean Foods Company, Western Quality Food Products, and Cumberland Dairy in 
opposition to NMPF’s proposal); see also Good Food Institute, Tell Congress to Dump the 
“DAIRY PRIDE Act,” CHANGE.ORG (2018) https://www.change.org/p/u-s-senate-tell-
congress-to-dump-the-dairy-pride-act [https://perma.cc/75YN-Y4LG] [hereinafter GFI 
Change.org Petition] (detailing GFI’s petition to the Senate which allows individual 
citizens to become involved in opposing the DAIRY PRIDE Act. As of April 26, 2019, 
50,571 individuals offered their support.). 
 16 Mia De Graff, War on ‘Fake Milk’: Dairy Industry Begs FDA to Ban Almond and 
Soy Alternatives from ‘Masquerading as the Real Thing’—but Do We Care?, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 
3, 2017, 3:31 PM EDT), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-4278160/Mayo-wings-
butter-Fake-milk-latest-food-fight.html [https://perma.cc/JJ8C-HHHQ] (“The [NMFP] says it 
has been trying to get the FDA to enforce the standard since at least 2000, and that the lack of 
enforcement has led to a proliferation of imitators playing ‘fast and loose’ with dairy terms.”). 
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to lobby Congress to introduce decisive legislation on the 
matter.17 To bring a conclusion to the abiding feud, members of 
both houses of Congress introduced the “Defending Against 
Imitations and Replacements of Yogurt, Milk, and Cheese to 
Promote Regular Intake of Dairy Everyday Act” or the “DAIRY 
PRIDE Act,” in January 2017.18 As proposed, however, the 
content-based restriction advanced in the DAIRY PRIDE Act 
implicates significant questions as to the practicability and 
constitutionality of the proposed solution. 
If passed, the DAIRY PRIDE Act will amend the 
misbranding section of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act19 and require the FDA to “issue draft guidance on how 
enforcement” would be carried out within ninety days of the bill’s 
ratification.20 In effect, the bill would force milk alternative 
product manufacturers to remove “milk” and other dairy specific 
words from product names, packaging, and advertisements or 
further qualify such terms by adding language like “substitute” or 
“imitation” to avoid enforcement action.21 Such a prohibition 
places a content-based restriction on commercial speech, 
effectively curbing manufacturers’ right to describe and advertise 
their products, and as such may impose an unconstitutional 
restriction on their First Amendment right to free speech.22 
This note examines the relationship between proposed 
restrictions of commercial speech and manufacturers’ First 
Amendment right to describe products to consumers. This note 
argues that broad, content-based commercial speech 
restrictions, like that proposed in the DAIRY PRIDE Act, likely 
impose unconstitutional limits on manufacturers’ First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech. The note proposes that 
Congress and the FDA should refrain from passing a statute or 
promulgating a regulation like the DAIRY PRIDE Act, because 
 
 17 NMPF News Release, supra note 14. 
 18 See S. 130, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017–2018); H.R. 778, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017–2018). 
Because the 115th Congress ended in 2018, the DAIRY PRIDE Act was reintroduced in 
March 2019. See S. 792, 116th Cong. (2019–2020); H.R. 1769, 116th Cong. (2019–2020). 
 19 S. 130 § 3 (“No food may be introduced or delivered for introduction into 
interstate commerce using a market name for a dairy product if the food does not meet the 
criterion set forth for dairy products under paragraph (z)(2) of section 403 of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. [§ ]343) (as added by section 4(a))”); see also H.R. 778 § 3. 
 20 S. 130 § 4(b)(1); H.R. 778 § 4(b)(1); see also DAIRY PRIDE Act One Pager, 
National Milk Producers Federation, http://www.nmpf.org/files/DAIRY%20PRIDE%20
Act%20-%20One%20Pager.pdf [https://perma.cc/XMK6-QFMY]. 
 21 S. 130 § 4(b)(1); H.R. 778 § 4(b)(1); see also 21 U.S.C. § 343(c) (2012). 
 22 See FDA-2017-P-1298, Citizen Petition from Good Food Inst. to Recognize the 
Use of Well-Established Common and Usual Compound Nomenclatures for Food, at 35 (Mar. 
2, 2017), http://www.gfi.org/images/uploads/2017/03/GFIpetitionFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5E29-YPES] [hereinafter GFI Citizen Petition]; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (The First 
Amendment states “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”). 
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such limitations likely impede on manufacturers’ rights, and in 
practice, would allow the Dairy industry to create a de facto 
monopoly in an increasingly competitive market.23 
This note proceeds in the following parts. Part I provides 
a brief history of the conflict between big dairy and plant-based 
alternative product manufacturers. This Part also explores 
existing statutes, guidance proffered by regulatory agencies, and 
their significance to the present conflict. Part II describes the 
First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech in the context 
of manufacturers’ rights and analyzes the restrictions proposed in 
the DAIRY PRIDE Act under the test for determining whether 
such restrictions are lawful exercises of legislative power through 
the four-part test from Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission of New York.24 Finally, Part III 
proposes that adding regulations to control the proportions and 
location of disclaimers on product labels and in advertising would 
serve the government’s stated purpose for advancing the DAIRY 
PRIDE Act without implicating the level of constitutional 
scrutiny triggered by content-based speech restrictions. 
I. THE TWENTY-YEAR STRUGGLE OVER “MILK” 
The conflict between the dairy and plant-based 
alternative industries over use of the word “milk” in product 
names and advertisements, began more than twenty years ago. 
In February 1997, SANA petitioned the FDA to amend their 
existing “Common or Unusual Name for Nonstandardized 
Foods” regulation to recognize “soymilk” as the correct name for 
“the liquid food that is obtained as a result of combining 
aqueous-extracted whole soybean solids and water, or, as a 
result of combining other edible-quality soy protein solids, 
soybean oil, and water.”25 The petition cited the accuracy of the 
beverage’s name,26 the long-term existence of the product in the 
United States and abroad,27 and the prevalence of the term 
 
 23 It is unclear whether passing the DAIRY PRIDE Act will actually cause an 
increase in dairy product sales. For example, Canada banned plant-based products from 
being labeled “milk” in 2009, but purchase of dairy products has continued to decline. 
Michelle St. Pierre, Changes in Canadians’ Preferences for Milk and Dairy Products, 
1960 to 2015, STATISTICS CANADA (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-
quotidien/170421/dq170421e-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q8X-HUTQ]. 
 24 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980). 
 25 SANA Citizen Petition, supra note 8, at 1. 
 26 Id. at 2. 
 27 Id. at 3. (citing SOYBEAN BLUE BOOK 72 (Am. Soybean Ass’n 1947); Harry 
W. Miller & C. Jean Wen, Experimental Nutrition Studies of Soymilk in Human 
Nutrition, 50 CHINESE MED. J. 450–59 (1936)). 
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“soymilk” in official and industry publications as persuasive 
evidence for altering the regulation.28 The FDA issued a response 
officially acknowledging receipt of the petition but declining to 
address the issue further.29 In 2000, NMPF indirectly responded 
by submitting a trade complaint to the FDA concerning the 
“rapidly expanding misuse of the name of a standardized food in 
the labeling of certain food products.”30 NMPF’s trade complaint 
argued that the word “milk” should be read pursuant to 21 
C.F.R. § 131.110, which defines the term as the “lacteal 
secretion, practically free from colostrum, obtained by the 
complete milking of one or more healthy cows.”31 
In response, SANA submitted a follow-up letter to 
NMPF’s correspondence; here, SANA admitted that NMPF’s 
interpretation of the word “milk” was not incorrect, but 
maintained that the statute should be read narrowly.32 SANA 
argued that the term soymilk did not violate the FDA’s definition 
of “milk” or its standard of identity, because the language of the 
regulation limited its scope to the unqualified, or standalone, 
term. Thus, by referring to the alternative beverage as “soymilk,” 
SANA claimed that their product name fell outside the scope of 
the FDA regulation.33 Again, the FDA issued a letter recognizing 
receipt of the petition, but the agency abstained from taking 
action or offering guidance in response to either party’s requests, 
apparently due to a lack of sufficient economic resources and the 
low priority afforded to resolving the conflict.34 In 2008 and 2012, 
the FDA issued warning letters to two different soy product 
manufacturers, but thus far, the FDA has not pursued further 
enforcement action against either company, even though the 
conduct at issue appears to be ongoing.35 
 
 28 Id. at 3–4. 
 29 1997 Scarbrough Interim Response Letter, supra note 10. 
 30 2000 Byrne Letter, supra note 13, at 1.  
 31 Id. at 2 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 131.110 (2000)). Merriam-Webster defines 
“colostrum” as “milk secreted for a few days after childbirth and characterized by high 
protein and antibody content.” Colostrum, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/colostrum [https://perma.cc/J6EE-TSKV]. 
 32 2000 Chapman Letter, supra note 15, at 1–2. 
 33 Id. at 2–3. 
 34 See Letter from Loretta A. Carey, Div. of Standards & Labeling Regs., U.S. 
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. to Nancy Chapman, Exec. Dir., Soyfoods Ass’n of N. 
Am. (July 31, 2000) (on file with Brooklyn Law Review) (acknowledging receipt of letters 
and agreeing to consider altering their regulations, or in the alternative to reach a 
decision on how such regulations would be enforced, but conditioned any action on the 
allocation of sufficient resources for the 2001 fiscal year by the Center for Food Safety 
and Applied Nutrition). It may be assumed that the Center for Food Safety and Applied 
Nutrition failed to adequately finance further exploration of the issue for the 2001 fiscal 
year because the FDA did not pursue this issue further. 
 35 Letter from Barbara J. Cassen, Dist. Dir., Pub. Health Serv., U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, to Yan Hui Fang, CEO, Fong Kee Tofu Co., Inc. (Mar. 7, 2012), 
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After decades of litigation and numerous appeals to the 
FDA,36 the Good Food Institute (GFI) submitted a new petition 
to the FDA in March 2017, with a request similar to the SANA’s 
1997 citizen’s petition.37 Several additional organizations, 
including the New York Bar City Association, also sent 
correspondence in opposition to the DAIRY PRIDE Act to the 
FDA.38 In a letter, the FDA acknowledged receipt of the petition, 
but further action remains to be seen.39 While continuing to 
pursue FDA guidance, dissatisfaction with the present 
ambiguity led leaders in the dairy industry to seek alternative 
solutions, including pursuing litigation to strengthen and 
enforce FDA regulations in their favor. 
Despite strong opposition to restricting use of the term 
“milk,”40 members of Congress have begun to rally together 
around the dairy industry by introducing the DAIRY PRIDE 
Act.41 Apparently advanced to counter the FDA’s silence, the 
 
https://www.fdalabelcompliance.com/letters/ucm295239 [https://perma.cc/8SER-5GWB]; 
Letter from Alonza E. Cruise, Dist. Dir., Pub. Health Serv., U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, to Long H. Lai, Lifesoy, Inc. (Aug. 8, 2008), https://www.fdalabel
compliance.com/letters/ucm1048184 [https://perma.cc/V2GA-FVPM]; see also GFI Citizen 
Petition, supra note 22, at 26 n.69 (recognizing that the FDA had issued two warning 
letters to Fong Kee Tofu Co. and Lifesoy, in 2012 and 2008, respectively). 
 36 Notably, NMPF submitted a comment in the “Point of Purchase Nutrition 
Information (Front-of Pack and Shelf Tag Nutrition Symbols), Docket No. FDA-2010-N-
0210” rulemaking, asking “the FDA to significantly increase enforcement efforts to 
prevent misbranding of certain food items that are imitations of standardized dairy 
products,” in July of 2010. Nat’l Milk Prod. Fed’n, Comment Letter on Point of Purchase 
Nutrition Information (Front-of Pack and Shelf Tag Nutrition Symbols), Docket No. 
FDA-2010-N-0210 (July 28, 2010), http://law-bites.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/
NMPFcomment2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8FD-776J]. 
 37 GFI Citizen Petition, supra note 22, at 1. 
 38 LORI A. BARRETT & CARLA A. LATTY, ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., 
REPORT ON LEGISLATION BY THE ANIMAL LAW COMMITTEE AND THE CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
COMMITTEE (2017), http://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/201782-Dairy
PrideAct_FINAL_3.1.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/37Q9-XXE5]. 
 39 Interim Response Letter from Douglas A. Balentine, Dir., Ctr. for Food 
Safety & Applied Nutrition, to Nigel Barrella, Good Food Inst. (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2017-P-1298-
0091&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/NEY4-C7FF]. 
 40 See, e.g., Michele Simon, Plant Based Coalition Lobbies Congress to Oppose 
Dairy Pride Act, PRWEB (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.prweb.com/pdfdownload/14866415.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P6ZA-MG4P] (“[A]dvocates and organizations representing manufacturers 
of plant-based foods, including the Soyfoods Association of North America, the Good Food 
Institute, Blue Diamond, and Campbell Soup Company, have come together to oppose the 
Dairy Pride Act.”); see also GFI Change.org Petition, supra note 15; Eric M. Erba & Andrew 
M. Novakovic, The Evolution of Milk Pricing and Government Intervention in Dairy Markets, 
CORNELL PROGRAM ON DAIRY MARKETS AND PRICING 6–16 (Feb. 1995), https://
dairymarkets.org/pubPod/pubs/EB9505.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFL6-S5BT] (demonstrating 
that Congress has taken an active role subsidizing the dairy industry since it passed the 
Agriculture Adjustment Act in 1933). 
 41 DAIRY PRIDE Act Supporters Keep Grassroots Pressure on Congress, NAT’L 
MILK PROD. FED’N (2018), http://www.nmpf.org/latest-news/articles/dairy-pride-act-
supporters-keep-grassroots-pressure-congress [https://perma.cc/ZJ45-J7XA] (stating 
that support for the DAIRY PRIDE Act continues to grow through grassroot efforts and 
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DAIRY PRIDE Act, as proposed, would alter section 403 of the 
Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act42 to include “[n]o food may be 
introduced or delivered into interstate commerce using a market 
name for a dairy product” unless it “contains as a primary 
ingredient, or is derived from a lateral secretion, particularly 
free from colostrum, obtained by the complete milking of one or 
more hooved animals.”43 The bill defines the phrase “market 
name for a dairy product” as meeting definitions set forth for 
milk, heavy cream, sour cream, yogurt, various cheeses derived 
from milk, ice cream derived from cow’s milk, goat’s milk, and 
cow milk sherbet, as well as additional definitions set forth in 
“any successor regulations or any other term for which the 
Secretary has promulgated a standard of identity with respect 
to a food that is formulated with a dairy product . . . as the 
primary ingredient.”44 In practice, the DAIRY PRIDE Act 
prohibits manufacturers of alternative dairy foods from using 
“milk,” “ice cream,” “yogurt,” and “cheese” in their product 
names and advertisements.45 Interestingly, in September of 
2018, the FDA followed suit and opened a non-rulemaking notice 
and comment period titled, “Use of the Names of Dairy Foods in 
the Labeling of Plant-Based Products,”46 and extended the 
comment period through January 2019.47 In January 2019, 
NMPF submitted a new citizen petition to the FDA, and in 
response, the agency again initiated a non-rulemaking notice 
and comment period, here extending from February 2019 to 
August 2019.48 As of May 2019, no further action has been taken 
with regard to this initiative. However, the former 
Commissioner of the FDA, Scott Gottlieb, apparently indicated 
that producing an FDA guidance document on use of the term 
 
congressional backing from Senators King, Baldwin, Stabenow, Risch, and Crapo and 
Representatives Welch, Simpson, Duffy, Courtney, Valadao, DelBene, Peterson, 
Gallagher, Grothman, Kind, Rooney, Sensenbrenner, Nolan, Stefanik, and Comer). 
 42 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 403, 52 Stat. 1040, 1047 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)). 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012). Section 403 of the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act regulates misbranded food, nutritional labeling, and disclosures. 
 43 S. 130, 115th Cong. §§ 3, 4(a)(2) (2017). 
 44 S. 130. § 4(a)(3) (internal parenthesis omitted). 
 45 See S. 130 § 3. 
 46 Use of the Names of Dairy Foods in the Labeling of Plant-Based products, Notice, 
Request for Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 49,103 (Sept. 28, 2018). The FDA requested comments 
on “how consumers use these plant-based products . . . . [and] whether consumers are aware 
of and understand the basic nature, essential characteristics, characterizing ingredients, and 
nutritional differences between plant-based products and dairy foods.” Id. 
 47 Use of the Names of Dairy Foods in the Labeling of Plant-Based products, 
Notice, Extension of Comment Period, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,775 (Nov. 21, 2018). 
 48 See generally FDA-2019-p-0777-0001, Citizen Petition Submitted on Behalf of the 
National Milk Producers Federation (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?
D=FDA-2019-P-0777-0001 [https://perma.cc/PZS3-QFB2] [hereinafter NMPF Citizen Petition]. 
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“milk,” would take “close to a year,” possibly indicating that the 
agency is currently pursuing action on the topic.49  
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
RESTRICTIONS PROPOSED IN THE DAIRY PRIDE ACT 
A. Commercial Speech Jurisprudence 
The First Amendment states, inter alia, “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”50 Although 
significantly more limited than individuals’ rights, non-natural 
persons, like corporations, possess a constitutionally protected 
right to free speech.51 There is no explicit discussion of or reference 
to commercial speech in the Constitution that would distinguish 
it from non-commercial expression.52 In fact, the Supreme Court 
did not recognize commercial speech as protected by the 
Constitution until the latter half of the twentieth century.53 The 
Court first addressed and dismissed the concept of protected 
commercial speech in Valentine v. Chrestensen.54 Following 
Valentine,55 however, the Court revisited questions regarding 
commercial speech and incrementally accepted commercial 
expression as a protected right.56 
The Supreme Court recognized commercial speech as 
protected under the First Amendment in 1976 through Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc.57 The Court imposed limits on government regulation of 
 
 49 Edward Hale, Got Soy Beverage?, REG. REV. (Mar. 10, 2019), https://
www.theregreview.org/2019/03/20/hale-got-soy/ [https://perma.cc/LP9L-VD3Q] (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 50 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 51 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (“[T]he speech whose content deprives it of protection cannot 
simply be speech on a commercial subject.”). 
 52 U.S. CONST. amend I. The failure of the Constitution to distinguish between 
types of speech does not, in itself, mean that commercial expression automatically falls 
within a protected category, but rather indicates that arguments must be based on 
additional sources. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 
76 VA. L. REV. 627, 631 (1990). For example, “[T]he Constitution doesn’t mention child 
pornography either, and we know it receives no protection at all.” Id. (citing New York 
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)). 
 53 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution 
imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”). 
 54 Id. 
 55 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 
413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964). 
 56 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia., 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (“Advertising is 
not . . . stripped of all First Amendment protection. The relationship of speech to the 
marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.”). 
 57 Va. State Bd of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 761–62 (1976). In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court determined 
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commercial speech, but chose not to define the type of content 
that would fall outside of the protected category.58 In subsequent 
decisions, the Supreme Court articulated two variances between 
protected commercial and individual speech.59 First, commercial 
speech is more objective than noncommercial expression because 
the accuracy of statements can be verified more easily.60 Second, 
commercial speech is more durable than its noncommercial 
counterpart because it “is engaged in for profit,” and as such, is 
less likely to be “chilled by proper regulation.”61 
Although the Court provided some guidance, commercial 
speech still occupies a “position at the blurry crossroads of expressive 
and economic activity.”62 Protections of commercial speech represent 
an “attempt to reconcile heightened protection for free speech with 
legitimate deference to economic regulation [which] has generated 
strain and untidiness in commercial speech doctrine.”63 
At its core, “the doctrine of commercial speech rests on a 
clean distinction between the market for ideas and the market 
for goods and services.”64 The First Amendment creates strict 
safeguards to protect persons from government regulation of 
ideas, while majoritarian politics generally control in the 
 
restricting commercial enterprises from advertising to be unconstitutional based on the 
First Amendment, even if a party’s interest proves to be wholly economic. Id. at 761–62. 
The Court rejected the idea that expression with no purpose beyond proposing one or 
more commercial transactions was “so removed from any ‘exposition of ideas,’ and from 
‘truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the 
administration of Government,’ that it lacks all protection.” Id. at 762 (citations omitted) 
(first quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), then quoting 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
 58 Id. at 761 (“If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First 
Amendment protection, therefore, it must be distinguished by its content. Yet the speech 
whose content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject.”). 
 59 Id. at 771–72 n.24 (1976); see also e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. 
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980); Freedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Bates 
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977). 
 60 Kozinski & Banner, supra note 52, at 634. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 
MD. L. REV. 55, 146 (1999). The Court articulated the accepted definition of commercial 
speech in Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm’n on Human Relations, wherein it was 
described as speech that only “propose[s] a commercial transaction.” 413 U.S. 376, 385 
(1973). Dicta in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy somewhat clarified the doctrine by giving 
examples of speech falling outside of the scope of commercial expression. 425 U.S. 748, 
761 (1976). The Court excluded expression projected by or made to solicit money, speech 
about commercial topics, and factual expression on a commercial subject from the scope 
of commercial speech. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 52, at 638; see also Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761; N.Y. Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963). 
 63 Stern, supra note 62, at 146 (footnotes omitted). 
 64 Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic 
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979). 
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economic sphere.65 As such, commercial speech is “subject to 
numerous restrictions that would be unconstitutional if applied 
to [noncommercial speech].”66 Courts have applied different tests 
and methods of analysis to resolve questions of whether a 
particular type of speech is commercial, and if it is, whether a 
regulation withstands constitutional scrutiny.67 A court’s 
determination of whether a particular form of expression 
constitutes commercial speech, “represents a categorical 
approach that affords scope for the individualized adjustments 
associated with balancing tests.”68 The “combination of 
coherence and flexibility offers a constructive framework for 
dealing with an intrinsically untidy area.”69 The Court 
established the main test for commercial speech in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Services Commission.70 
Content-based restrictions of commercial speech trigger a 
level of evaluation comparable to intermediate scrutiny.71 To 
survive an intermediate scrutiny analysis, statutes must further 
an important government interest and the means employed must 
be substantially related to that interest.72 Likewise, the four-part 
test used to evaluate whether restrictions on commercial 
expression impose unconstitutional restraints on such speech73 
requires that the government interest be substantial and that the 
restriction reasonably advance that interest.74 Moreover, in the 
context of a Central Hudson analysis, the government’s interest 
for restricting commercial speech cannot be exemplary of naked 
 
 65 Id. (“[I]n the economic sphere . . . the majoritarian political process controls.”) 
Natural persons enjoy additional safeguards not extended to business associations or non-
natural persons; one example of these safeguards is the overbreadth doctrine, which allows a 
party to challenge a law restricting free speech on the ground that it may curtail another 
individual’s First Amendment rights, despite otherwise lacking sufficient standing to 
challenge the law. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 
U.S. 489, 496–97 (1982); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
844, 844–45 (1970).(“[T]he overbreadth doctrine does not [extend] to commercial speech.”). 
 66 Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 64, at 2. 
 67 Michael Mazur, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment in the 21st 
Century Does the Nike Test Help Keep Corporations Honest?, 5 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 999, 
999–1000 (2005). 
 68 Stern, supra note 62, at 142. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
 71 Commercial Speech Restrictions, AM. BAR ASS’N 1 (May 2016) (on file with 
Brooklyn Law Review). At first blush, the Central Hudson test appears more akin to a 
strict scrutiny analysis, but the Court declined to extend such an analysis to commercial 
speech in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly. 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 (2001). 
 72 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1972). 
 73 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 74 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564. 
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paternalism.75 The court will likely analyze challenges to the 
DAIRY PRIDE Act by applying the Central Hudson test.76 
B. Application of the Central Hudson Test to the Non-Dairy 
Product’s “Milk” Label 
After determining that a form of speech is commercial, most 
modern courts utilize the four-part test articulated in Central 
Hudson.77 Due to the nature of the restriction in the DAIRY PRIDE 
Act, it appears clear that the bill seeks to regulate commercial 
speech through a content-based restriction and without imposing a 
limitation on individual speech. This constraint, if enacted, would 
regulate the names of products sold to consumers, but would not 
place any real restriction on individual speech. 
After establishing that the statute would impose a 
restriction to commercial speech, courts will likely move to 
analyze the proposed restrictions under the four-part Central 
Hudson test. Under this test, a reviewing court first asks, 
whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For 
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern 
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, [a court] ask[s] whether the 
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield 
positive answers, [the reviewing court] must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and 
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.78 
 
 75 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374–76 (2002). 
 76 In its most recent citizen petition, NMPF attempts to supplement the Central 
Hudson analysis with the standard articulated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
of the Supreme Court of Ohio. NMPF Citizen Petition, supra note 48, at 44–65. In Zauderer, 
the Court declined to follow Central Hudson’s four-part test, reasoning that disclosure 
requirements are fundamentally different from prohibitions, and as such, determined that 
the government need only demonstrate that “disclosure requirements are reasonably related 
to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio., 741 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). It should be 
noted that Zauderer and its progeny apply when the government seeks to compel disclosure 
of factual and uncontroversial information, whereas Central Hudson applies when the 
government wishes to impose a restriction on commercial speech. See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. 
USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s analysis of the 
disclosure requirement in Zauderer does not reformulate the Central Hudson standard but 
rather establishes a different standard based on the ‘material differences between disclosure 
requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.’” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650)); 
Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Commercial disclosure 
requirements are treated differently from restrictions on commercial speech because 
mandated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information does not offend the core 
First Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information or protecting 
individual liberty interests.”). The DAIRY PRIDE Act, if enacted, would prohibit non-dairy 
product manufacturers from using words like “milk” in product names and advertisements, 
and as such should be analyzed under the Central Hudson framework. 
 77 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
 78 Id. 
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To adequately apply Central Hudson’s four-part test, courts 
consider the commercial expression at issue and its context; all four 
factors must be satisfied to uphold a restriction on commercial 
speech.79 Although the reasons for regulating speech espoused in 
the DAIRY PRIDE Act demonstrate a substantial governmental 
interest, the speech at issue is not inherently deceptive, the means 
of regulation may not advance the government’s stated goal, and 
the restriction is not a reasonable fit for advancing the 
government’s interest. As such, the DAIRY PRIDE Act will likely 
fail to withstand a Central Hudson analysis. 
1. Whether the Commercial Speech Is Unlawful or May 
Mislead Consumers 
Determining whether speech is deceptive or unlawful, 
under the first part of the Central Hudson test, does not require 
extensive constitutional analyses. Rather, only intrinsically 
misleading speech categorically falls outside of First 
Amendment protections and, as such, outside the scope of 
analysis under Central Hudson.80 The Court couches potentially 
misleading speech within the scope of protected expression and 
analyzes it under a heightened level of scrutiny.81 Thus, any 
government restriction must be narrowly tailored to a 
substantial state interest.82 The government carries the burden 
of demonstrating that its interest in curtailing deception is 
substantial and directly and narrowly tailored.83 
The government likely will not be able to demonstrate that 
product names like soymilk and almond milk inherently mislead 
consumers,84 even though proponents of the DAIRY PRIDE Act 
often refer to the names of products like “soymilk” or “almond 
milk” as “misleading” in rhetoric.85 Alternative dairy products 
have used names like soymilk, almond milk, and coconut milk for 
decades;86 such names, which include the name of the traditional 
product with an additional qualifying word or phrase 
accompanying the product name, appear pervasively throughout 
 
 79 Id. 
 80 See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing, inter alia, 
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). 
 81 Id. at 655–56. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993). 
 84 See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (describing the “inherently 
misleading” standard as having an “awesome impact,” bound to mislead consumers). 
 85 See, e.g., S. 130, 115th Cong. § 2(6) (2017). 
 86 SANA Citizen Petition, supra note 8, at 2–3 (citing Harry W. Miller & C. 
Jean Wen, Experimental Nutrition Studies of Soymilk in Human Nutrition, 50 CHINESE 
MED. J., 450, 450–59 (1936)). 
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the market, without confusing consumers.87 Courts have 
considered the issue on numerous occasions and determined that 
no reasonable consumer would be deceived by qualified product 
names.88 It must be conceded that products bearing names 
commonly associated with another product may have the 
potential to deceive consumers, but courts have determined that 
consumers generally understand and are not confused by 
products bearing qualified dairy product names.89 
2. Whether the Government Possesses a Substantial 
Interest in Restricting Commercial Speech 
The government possesses a legitimate and substantial 
interest in ensuring that product names and other information 
presented to consumers accurately represent the product being 
sold, and in increasing national health.90 The findings advanced 
as justifications for the enactment of the DAIRY PRIDE Act, 
particularly claims relating to national health, demonstrate the 
existence of a legitimate government interest. These findings 
include: (1) the majority of individuals in the United States, 
including both adults and children, fail to meet their 
recommended dairy intake, as set forth in the 2015–2020 
Dietary Guidelines for Americans, a publication by the 
Department for Health and Human Services and Department of 
Agriculture,91 potentially leading to serious or deadly diseases;92 
 
 87 See Letter from Nancy Chapman, Exec. Dir., Soyfoods Ass’n of N. Am., to 
Stephen Ostroff, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., and Susan T. Mayne, Dir., Ctr. 
for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition 3 (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.soyfoods.org/wp-content/
uploads/FDA_Letter_from-SANA-2.2.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6SC-KN67] [hereinafter 
2017 Chapman Letter]. In 2006, a member of SANA commissioned a professional market 
research organization, Market Tools, to perform a study to gauge customer perception and 
understanding of “soymilk.” Id. The firm surveyed 814 people and found that only three 
percent of people surveyed believed the product contained cow’s milk. Id. 
 88 See, e.g., Gitson v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 1:17-cv-00117, 2015 WL 9121232, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2015) (“Soymilk . . . does not ‘purport [ ]  to be’ from a cow within the 
meaning of section 343(g).” (alteration in original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 343(g) (2012))); Ang 
v. Whitewave Foods Co., No. 13-CV-1953, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013). 
 89 Gitson, 2015 WL 9121232, at *2; Ang, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4. 
 90 What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194879.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VTD6-PJYP]. 
 91 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2015–
2020 DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 23, 49 (8th ed. 2015), https://health.gov/
dietaryguidelines/2015/resources/2015-2020_Dietary_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B7ME-6P89] [hereinafter DIETARY GUIDELINES]. Notably, the “[a]verage dairy intake for 
most young children ages [one] to [three] years meets recommended amounts, but all 
other age groups have average intakes that are below recommendations.” Id. at 49. 
Further, the 2015–2020 Dietary Guidelines for Americans includes soymilk as part of 
the recommended dairy products. Id. at 23, 49. 
 92 S. 130, 115th Cong. § 2(1) (2017). 
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(2) dairy foods provide key nutrients, including vitamin D, 
calcium, potassium and magnesium;93 (3) women are less likely 
to receive the recommended amount of calcium compared to 
their male counterparts;94 (4) plant-based milk alternative 
products do not possess the same amount of vitamin D and 
potassium as cow’s milk;95 (5) imitation products do not provide 
the same nutritional value as products made from dairy cows;96 
(7) the FDA defines milk narrowly, excluding plant-based 
alternatives;97 and (6/8) enforcement should be improved 
because the proliferation of milk imitation products in the 
marketplace puts consumers at risk of being deceived.98 
While some of the justifications articulated in the bill rely 
on incomplete or disproven information, other considerations, 
especially those relating to health and consumer protection, 
should be considered as legitimate government interests. Thus, 
Congress possesses a legitimate interest in promoting accuracy 
in the information presented to the public, especially as it 
appears on consumable products.99 
3. Whether the Proposed Regulation Directly Advances 
the Government’s Expressed Interest 
Under the Central Hudson test, a regulation must directly 
advance a substantial government interest.100 Although less 
exacting than a strict scrutiny analysis, to satisfy this part of the 
test the government must demonstrate that the DAIRY PRIDE Act 
directly advances consumer health and financial protection.101 
The DAIRY PRIDE Act professes to protect consumers 
from misconceptions and deception caused by the product names 
and labels of dairy alternative goods. Although the FDA has 
been largely silent on the deceptiveness of non-dairy labels, the 
federal judiciary recently offered an interpretation of the present 
regulatory and legislative framework. The courts, however, 
 
 93 Id. § 2(2). 
 94 Id. § 2(3). 
 95 Id. § 2(4). 
 96 Id. § 2(5). 
 97 Id. § 2(7). 
 98 Id. §§ 2(6), 2(8). Despite being parroted about as one of the most common 
reasons for enacting the DAIRY PRIDE Act, statistical evidence and judicial decisions 
disprove the theory that customers are misled by the plant-based alternative products. 
See, e.g., 2017 Chapman Letter, supra note 87, at 2–3; see also Ang v. Whitewave Foods 
Co., No. 13-CV-1953, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013). 
 99 What Does FDA Regulate?, supra note 90. 
 100 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566, 569 (1980). 
 101 Id. at 566. 
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reached the opposite conclusion to that asserted by the drafters 
of the DAIRY PRIDE Act.102 
Federal courts recently deemed it inconceivable that a 
reasonable consumer103 would be misled into thinking products 
bearing the names like soymilk or almond milk actually contain 
cow’s milk. In Ang v. WhiteWave Foods Co., the court rejected 
the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant misbranded products by 
using titles like “almond milk” in the names of their foods.104 The 
plaintiff argued that 21 C.F.R. § 131.110 defines milk as coming 
from a cow, and stated that products bearing names using the 
same term, like almond milk, coconut milk, and soymilk create 
an identical belief in consumers.105 The court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claims, stating “[i]t is simply implausible that a 
reasonable consumer would mistake a product like soymilk or 
almond milk with dairy milk from a cow. The first words in the 
products’ names should be obvious enough to even the least 
discerning of consumers.”106 
Likewise, in Gitson v. Trader Joe’s Co., a federal district 
court determined use of the word “soymilk” in Trader Joe’s products 
did not violate the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.107 The 
court held that “[t]he reasonable consumer (indeed, even the least 
sophisticated consumer) does not think soymilk comes from a cow. 
To the contrary, people drink soymilk in lieu of cow’s milk.”108 
Moreover, the FDA already requires manufacturers to 
use qualifying language to aid consumers in distinguishing milk 
products from non-dairy substitutes, further limiting the ability 
of the legislation like the DAIRY PRIDE Act to meet its stated 
goals. To avoid consumer deception, the FDA utilizes standards 
of identity, codified in section 403(g) of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act,109 to evaluate whether a product that incorporates 
the name of a standardized food unlawfully misleads consumers. 
The Act states, inter alia, that products using the name of 
statutorily defined foods are misbranded if they 
 
 102 Compare Ang, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4 with S. 130, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). 
 103 Ang at *4 (“False advertising claims under the [California state law] are 
governed by the reasonable consumer standard, whereby a plaintiff must show that 
members of the public are likely to be deceived.” (citing Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 
552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir.2008))). 
 104 Id. at *4. 
 105 Id. at *3. 
 106 Id. at *4. 
 107 Gitson v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 13-cv-01333-VC, 2015 WL 9121232, at *6–7 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2015); see also 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012 & Supp. V. 2018) (setting out 
the prohibition against misbranding in the FDCA); id. § 343. 
 108 Gitson, 2015 WL 9121232, at *1. 
 109 Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 403, 52 Stat. 1047 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(g)). 
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purport [ ]  to be or [are] represented as a food for which a definition 
and standard of identity has been prescribed by regulations as 
provided by section 341 of this title, unless. . . [they] conform [ ]  to 
such definition and standard, and [their] label bears the name of the 
food specified in the definition and standard.110 
Notably, the Court interprets the words “purport” and 
“represent” to suggest “the idea of counterfeit.”111 In Gitson, the 
court determined that 
the fact that the FDA has standardized milk does not categorically 
preclude a company from giving any food product a name that includes 
the word “milk.” Rather as the language of section 343(g) indicates, the 
standardization of “milk” simply means a company cannot pass off a 
product as milk if it does not meet the regulatory definition of “milk.”112 
The court went on to determine that Trader Joe’s soymilk never 
attempted to pass itself off as milk, as evidenced by use of “soy” 
in the product label.113 
The drafters of the DAIRY PRIDE Act, however, reached 
an opposite interpretation, explicitly stating “[p]lant-based 
products labeled as milk are misleading to consumers,” among 
the legislative findings necessitating the enactment of the bill, 
but without including any corroborating evidence supporting the 
assertion.114 Further, it appears the drafters of the Act failed to 
acknowledge another FDA regulation, which asserts that the 
presence of a standard of identity “does not necessarily preclude 
the use of the standardized name in connection with the name 
of a nonstandarized food, and ‘in some cases it may be necessary 
to . . . provide the consumer with accurate, descriptive, and fully 
informative labeling.’”115 Based on these contrary judicial 
findings and FDA regulations inconsistent with the consumer 
protection rationale expressed in the DAIRY PRIDE Act, the 
Act’s content-based restriction on speech will likely not advance 
the government’s interest.116 
 
 110 Id. (emphasis added). 
 111 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 600 (1951); see also GFI 
Citizen Petition, supra note 22, at 17–18. 
 112 Gitson, 2015 WL 9121232, at *2 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 343(g)). 
 113 Id. 
 114 S. 130, 115th Cong. § 2(6) (2017). 
 115 Nonfat Dry Milk, low-fat Dry Milk, Dry Whole Milk, and Dry Cream; 
Standards of Identity; Confirmation of Effective Date and a Further Amendment, 44 
Fed. Reg. 3964, 3965 (Jan. 19, 1979) (quoting Imitation Foods; Application of the Term 
“Imitation,” 38 Fed. Reg. 20702, 20703 (Aug. 2, 1973)). 
 116 See BARRETT & LATTY, supra note 38, at 2–5 (arguing that the government’s 
interest in consumer protection will not be advanced by the DAIRY PRIDE Act because 
the underlying problem, that consumers are being misled by the term “milk” in names 
and advertisements of non-dairy substitute products, does not exist). 
1016 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:3 
In addition to consumer protection, the DAIRY PRIDE 
Act claims to advance consumer health, but these legislative 
findings misrepresent recommendations in the Dietary 
Guidelines published by the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services and the United States Department of 
Agriculture. The legislative findings relevant here claim that 
dairy products play an important role in individual health for 
adults and children, that most Americans are not meeting their 
recommended dairy intake, and that dairy products provide 
consumers with nutrients under consumed by most 
Americans.117 The aforementioned legislative findings rely on 
dietary guidelines published by the Department of Health and 
Human Services and the Department of Agriculture, but they 
fail to disclose one critical piece of information:118 Fortified 
soymilk is included under “Dairy” in the Dietary Guidelines for 
2015–2020.119 As such, all of the health findings articulated in 
the legislative justifications apply to at least one plant-based 
milk alternative product.120 Moreover, the Dietary Guidelines 
recommend that the American populous increase consumption 
of certain foods in the dairy group, including fortified soymilk.121 
Similar to the government’s consumer protection motive, the 
Act’s content-based speech restriction will likely not advance the 
government’s interest to promote individual health.122 
4. Whether the Restraint Imposes Limitations More 
Extensive Than Necessary to Satisfy a Substantial 
Government Interest 
Even if a court determines that the DAIRY PRIDE Act 
advances the government’s expressed interests, the government 
will, nevertheless, fail to satisfy the final element of the Central 
Hudson analysis. Unlike the other parts of the test, which 
remain largely unaltered from those set forth in the initial 
decision, the Court has revised, and ultimately watered down, 
the final analysis prong.123 In Board of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 
 
 117 S.130, 115th Cong. §§ 2(1)–(3) (2017). 
 118 BARRETT & LATTY, supra note 38, at 5 (“Astonishingly, the legislative 
findings fail to disclose a crucial fact: The Dietary Guidelines include fortified soymilk 
in the dairy group.”). 
 119 DIETARY GUIDELINES, supra note 91, at 23. 
 120 Id.; see also S. 130, 115th Cong. §§ 2(1), 2(2), 2(4) (2017). 
 121 Id. at 49. 
 122 See BARRETT & LATTY, supra note 38, at 5. 
 123 This is not to say the Court never altered the other prongs of the Central 
Hudson test. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 343–
44 (1986), the Court diluted the scrutiny afforded by Central Hudson to rational basis 
review. See also id. at 353 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In rejecting appellant’s equal 
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the Supreme Court modified the original least-restrictive-means 
test, which required statutes restricting commercial speech be 
the least restrictive means to advance a substantial interest.124 
Now, however, restrictions on commercial speech need only be a 
“reasonable fit” for advancing a substantial government interest 
to satisfy Central Hudson.125 Even analyzed under this lower 
standard, it remains unlikely that the restrictions set forth in 
the DAIRY PRIDE Act provide a reasonable fit to accomplish the 
government’s stated goals. 
The governmental interests advanced in the DAIRY 
PRIDE Act, which asserts to increase national health and 
assuage consumer confusion, are incompatible with the means set 
forth for achieving them, and thus, do not provide a reasonable 
solution for accomplishing the Act’s purpose. First, there is a lack 
of credible research suggesting that a reasonable consumer is 
unable to distinguish almond, coconut, or other non-dairy milk 
alternatives from traditional dairy milk, with the products’ 
current labels.126 Further, although attempted class action 
lawsuits have raised questions regarding products liability and 
misrepresentation on the part of plant-based milk alternatives, 
such cases have largely been dismissed on summary judgment or 
during the pleading stage of litigation.127 
Manufacturers of plant-based dairy products already 
differentiate their products from more traditional commodities 
 
protection claim, the Court erroneously uses a ‘rational basis’ analysis, thereby ignoring 
the important First Amendment interests implicated by this case.” (citing Police Dept. 
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972)). The Court reversed this change in the late 
1990s. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 182–
86 (1999); 44 Liquormart Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 509–13 (1996). 
 124 Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480–81 (1989) (the 
Court “declin[ed] to impose [the] least-restrictive-means requirement,” and instead 
stated that “since the State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions, it must 
affirmatively establish the reasonable fit we require.” (citations omitted)); see also 
Matthew Passalacqua, Note, There’s Something Brewing Within the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 607, 618–19 (2011). 
 125 Fox, 492 U.S. at 480–81. 
 126 See 2017 Chapman Letter, supra note 87, at 3 (In a survey of 814 
individuals, only three percent of participants believed the product contained cow’s milk 
and only five percent stated they mistakenly purchased soymilk in lieu of cow’s milk.). 
 127 See, e.g., Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n. v. Harris, 653 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 
1981) (wherein NMPF “alleged the invalidity of a FDA regulation that authorizes 
qualifying food products to bear a label describing these products as ‘substitute[s]’ rather 
than as ‘imitation[s],’” and that “the FDA had unlawfully approved the marketing of food 
products as cheese substitutes and had unlawfully refused to enforce the regulation against 
such products” (alteration in original)); see also Ang v. Whitewave Foods Co., No. 13-CV-
1953, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013) (“[I]t is simply implausible that a 
reasonable consumer would mistake a product like soymilk or almond milk with dairy milk 
from a cow. The first words in the products’ names should be obvious enough even to the 
least discerning of consumers.”); Gitson v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 1:17-cv-00117-VC, 2015 
WL 9121232, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2015) (“Soymilk. . . does not ‘purport [ ]  to be’ from a 
cow within the meaning of section 343(g).” (alteration in original)). 
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by qualifying the word “milk” on their product labels and 
advertisements.128 The DAIRY PRIDE Act would require 
manufacturers to add an additional term, such as imitation, into 
their titles, or drop the word milk altogether and replace it with 
more generic language, like beverage.129 Rather than furthering 
the needs of the public, such a requirement primarily acts as a 
means of insulating the dairy industry from free-market 
competition, which some critics of the bill believe to be the main 
purpose for advancing the DAIRY PRIDE Act.130 
Despite offering seemingly altruistic justifications for 
supporting the DAIRY PRIDE Act, more nefarious explanations 
may be motivating NMPF and other interested groups in their 
pursuit of such drastic legislative action. In SANA’s response to 
NMPF’s 2000 letter asking the FDA to enforce 21 U.S.C. § 131.110 
to prevent labeling products as “soymilk,” the organization 
advanced the theory that “[t]he NMPF letter [was] a barely-
disguised effort to try to get the FDA to expend its resources to 
protect dairy milk producers from honest free-market competition 
by a nutritious and truthfully-described product.”131 
Although this argument lacked substantial merit when 
first advanced, evidence today may provide comparatively 
strong support for this assertion. Today, fifty-eight percent of 
consumers drink non-dairy milk and thirty-six percent consume 
plant-based meat alternatives.132 Sales of plant-based products 
designed to replace meat, dairy, and egg items rose to $3.1 
billion, with an 8.1% growth rate.133 Likewise, sales of plant-
based milk products rose at a rate of 3.1% as sales of traditional 
milk fell by five percent, and sales of other alternative dairy 
products rose by twenty percent.134 Further, non-dairy yogurt 
sales rose by a staggering fifty-six percent.135 It follows that the 
dairy industry might seek drastic action, including usurping the 
FDA by directly pursuing decisive legislation, to try to retain 
their foothold within the market.136 
 
 128 See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 3964, 3965 (Jan. 19, 1979) (quoting 38 Fed. Reg. 20702, 
20703 (Aug. 2, 1973)). 
 129 S. 130, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017). 
 130 See, e.g., GFI Citizen Petition, supra note 22, at 14–15. 
 131 2000 Chapman Letter, supra note 15, at 5. 
 132 Becky Schilling, The Future of Plant-Based Foods, SUPERMARKET NEWS (Sept. 
21, 2017), http://www.supermarketnews.com/consumer-trends/future-plant-based-foods 
[https://perma.cc/6AY5-RWHW]. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See Letter from Peter Welch, Member of Cong., et al., to Robert M. Califf, 
Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nmpf.org/wp-content/
uploads//Welch-Simpson%20Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/WV6G-DWQL]. 
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The New York City Bar Association explicitly referenced 
these tactics in a letter issued in support of the 2017 GFI Citizen 
Petition, stating that “[w]hile the Petition’s proposed regulation 
is not limited in scope to the names of plant-based products, 
given the recent effort of politicians to limit the product names 
of plant-based products . . . [GFI’s] Petition would limit the 
effect of such anti-competitive efforts.”137 
Even without the underlying, anti-competitive motivation 
however, the DAIRY PRIDE Act cannot withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. Although the government possesses a substantial 
interest in promoting the consumer health and preventing 
deception, the content-based restriction on commercial speech in 
the DAIRY PRIDE Act applies to speech that is neither inherently 
unlawful nor deceitful. Further, the proposed regulation of “milk” 
is unlikely to play any substantive role in advancing the 
government’s objectives, and as such, fails to provide a solution 
reasonably tailored to suit the government interest. It is unlikely, 
given the parameters, that the DAIRY PRIDE Act would 
withstand constitutional scrutiny, if challenged. 
III. MOVING FORWARD WITH AN EYE TOWARD COMPROMISE 
During the dispute over use of the term “milk,” the dairy 
and plant-based alternative industries have proposed potential 
modifications to the existing regulatory structure, generally 
requiring strict enforcement of existing regulations or 
modifications thereto. SANA’s first proposal, from its 1997 
citizen petition, served as the catalyst of the present debate.138 
At that time, SANA requested that the FDA commissioner 
amend Part 102 of the FDA regulations “to recognize ‘soymilk’ 
as the established common or usual name to be used in labels 
and other labeling to identify a beverage of this nature.”139 
NMPF fired back, asking that the FDA rigidly enforce their 
existing regulatory scheme and prohibit dairy substitutes from 
using “milk” in their products’ names.140 The administrative 
agency chose not to amend their regulations, while also 
functionally declining to follow a strict enforcement policy, 
essentially suspending SANA’s proposal in a state of regulatory 
 
 137 Letter from Lori Barrett-Peterson, Animal Law Comm. Chair, Ass’n of the Bar 
of N.Y. City, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Administration, at 4 (Aug. 23, 2017), 
http://documents.nycbar.org/files/FDA_Petition_Milk_Labeling_ANIMAL_8_23_17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AD7C-6RZZ]. 
 138 Calderon, et al., supra note 1. 
 139 SANA Citizen Petition, supra note 8, at 1. 
 140 2000 Byrne Letter, supra note 13, at 2–3 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 131.110). 
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limbo.141 Even after the passage of approximately twenty years, 
the same pattern persists.142 
In 2017, GFI drafted a new citizen petition. Like the original 
petition from SANA, the current proposal requests a change to 
existing FDA regulations. Specifically, GFI requested that the 
FDA amend 21 CFR § 102.5, to add the following language after part (d): 
(e) The common or usual name of food may be— 
(1) the common or usual name of another food preceded by a 
qualifying word or phrase that identifies (i) an alternative 
plant or animal source that replaces the main characterizing 
ingredient(s) or component(s) of such other food, or (ii) the 
absence of a primary characterizing plant or animal source, 
or of a nutrient, allergen, or other well-known characterizing 
substance, that is ordinarily present in such other food; or 
(2) any other word or phrase comprised of two or more terms, 
which may be separated by hyphens or spaces; but if such 
name includes the common or usual name of any other food, 
it must effectively notify consumers that the product is 
distinct from such other food.143 
The GFI petition asserts that its proposed regulatory 
alteration would not violate Section 403 of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act,144 as long as it would not cause a reasonable 
consumer to be misled or deceived.145 The FDA sent a response 
letter to GFI in which it acknowledged receipt of the petition.146 
Here, in contrast to its previous non-involvement policy, the 
FDA’s reply stated that the agency had been inundated with 
“competing priorities,” and claimed that it would “complete [its] 
review of the [Good Food Institute petition] and consider any 
amendments to [FDA] regulations as warranted in the contest 
of other programs within the Center,” rather than issuing an 
outright refusal to act.147 The reply from the FDA does not, 
however, promise to address the solutions proposed in GFI’s  
 141 Calderon, et al., supra note 1. 
 142 Linda A. Goldstein & Theodore J. Kobus III, Decades-Long Milk War Froths 
on, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1ea058a
8-1b4d-4f85-9b97-1581f9bbda43 [https://perma.cc/RJ5E-4762]. 
 143 GFI Citizen Petition, supra note 22, at 2. 
 144 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 403, 52 Stat. 1040, 1047 
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)). Section 403 of the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act regulates misbranded food, nutritional labeling, and disclosures. Id. 
 145 GFI Citizen Petition, supra note 22, at 2. 
 146 Dynna Bigby, Supervisor Admin. Proceedings Specialist, U.S. Federal Food 
and Drug Administration Division of Dockets Management, to Nigel Barrella, Good Food 
Inst. (Mar. 2, 2017) (on file with Brooklyn Law Review). 
 147 Interim Response Letter from Douglas A. Balentine, Dir., Ctr. for Food 
Safety & Applied Nutrition to Nigel Barrella, Good Food Inst. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-P-1298-0091 [https://perma.cc/5DSD-USLK]. 
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petition.148 Interestingly, approximately one year after receipt of 
the GFI petition, the FDA requested comments regarding a 
regulation that might be substantively similar to the DAIRY 
PRIDE Act.149 Although this mitigates the likelihood that the 
FDA will abstain from taking concrete action absent 
congressional mandate, it does not ensure that such action will 
be taken or necessarily indicate what avenue, if any, the agency 
will pursue to accomplish its goals. 
Thus far, all solutions proffered by SANA, NMPF, GFI and 
others, to end the abiding debate over use of the term milk, have 
proven unsuccessful. In spite of regulatory uncertainty, new 
foods, manufactured with substitute ingredients, proliferated 
throughout the market over the past twenty years.150 Regardless 
of whether the proposed restrictions are codified through the 
DAIRY PRIDE Act or an agency promulgated regulation, the 
broad commercial speech restrictions encompassed in the bill will 
likely impose an unconstitutional restraint on manufacturers’ 
First Amendment right to free speech.151 Still, the longevity and 
impassioned nature of debate over use of “milk” necessitates that 
some action should be taken to resolve the conflict. 
Rather than pursuing solutions proposed by GFI, NMPF, 
or SANA, the FDA should add regulations to control the size and 
location of disclaimers on product labels and in advertising, but 
expressly allow dairy substitute products to use “milk” and other 
dairy specific terms in product names and advertisements. 
While not completely satisfying the demands of any of the 
interested parties, this solution occupies a middle ground, and 
serves the governmental interests articulated in the DAIRY 
PRIDE Act, namely, to promote consumer health and protect 
against deception, without implicating the level of judicial 
scrutiny triggered by content-based speech restrictions.152 
 
 148 Keller & Heckman LLP, FDA Delays Decision on Plant-Based Milk Labeling 
Petition, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/fda-delays-
decision-plant-based-milk-labeling-petition [https://perma.cc/RYW7-4YD6]. 
 149 See Use of the Names of Dairy Foods in the Labeling of Plant-Based products, 
Notice, Extension of Comment Period, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,775 (Nov. 21, 2018); Use of the Names 
of Dairy Foods in the Labeling of Plant-Based products, Notice, Request for Comments, 83 
Fed. Reg. 49,103 (Sept. 28, 2018); see also NMPF Citizen Petition, supra note 48. 
 150 Calderon et al., supra note 1. 
 151 See supra Part II. 
 152 Requiring that alternative dairy product manufacturers alter product labels 
and advertisements so as to clearly communicate an item’s contents to consumers would 
impose a compelled disclosure requirement, and as such, would not act as an outright 
prohibition on manufacturers’ freedom of speech. As such, a court would likely evaluate 
the restriction under the test articulated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of 
the Supreme Court of Ohio, instead of applying the Central Hudson analysis. In 
Zauderer, the Court declined to follow Central Hudson’s four-part test, reasoning that 
disclosure requirements are fundamentally different from prohibitions, and as such, 
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The FDA employed a similar regulation strategy, though 
admittedly on a much smaller scale, when it settled a conflict over 
use of the term “mayonnaise.”153 The dispute over regulation of 
“mayonnaise,” aptly referred to as the “Mayo Wars” by the media, 
revolved around a single product, Just Mayo, an egg-free, vegan 
mayonnaise substitute.154 The conflict arose because the 
mayonnaise standard of identity requires products bearing the 
mayonnaise or mayo nomenclature to include eggs as an 
ingredient.155 In August 2015, the FDA issued a letter, accusing the 
Just Mayo manufacturer, Hampton Creek, of misbranding the 
product pursuant to section 403(r)(1)(A) of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act.156 The letter also alleged that that the company’s 
Siracha sauce was similarly misbranded and that the statements 
on the company’s website misled consumers into believing 
insufficiently substantiated health claims.157 Rather than forcing 
Hampton Creek to rename Just Mayo, the FDA accepted a 
compromise solution wherein the company would change its 
packaging by making phrases like “Egg-Free” more visible to 
consumers.158 Although applying a similar solution in the war on 
milk would require the regulations be applied on a much larger 
scale, the FDA should afford manufacturers of dairy substitute 
products the same deference it gave to Hampton Creek. 
The FDA should require manufacturers of plant-based 
alternative products to alter a product’s packaging if the agency 
determines such action is necessary to accurately communicate 
the composition of the item to consumers. These modifications 
should be limited, in all but the most egregious cases, to 
changing the size and placement of disclaimers that 
differentiate such substitute products from their more 
commonplace counterparts. Moreover, unless a product is 
clearly misbranded, pursuant to Part 403 of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act,159 the FDA should expressly permit the use of 
 
determined that the government need only demonstrate that “disclosure requirements 
are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).  
 153 See Beth Kowitt, The Mayo Wars Just Ended, FORTUNE (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/12/17/hampton-creek-just-mayo-fda/ [https://perma.cc/5DY8-8ZZS]. 
 154 Id. 
 155 21 C.F.R. § 169.140 (2018). 
 156 Warning Letter from William A. Correll, Jr., Dir., Ctr. for Food Safety & 
Applied Nutrition, to Joshua Tetrick, Founder & C.E.O., Hampton Creek Foods, Inc., at 
1–3 (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/
ucm458824.htm [https://perma.cc/28E3-T4TZ]. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See Kowitt, supra note 153. 
 159 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 403, 52 Stat. 1040, 1047 
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)); 21 U.S.C. § 343 
(2012 & Supp. V 2018). 
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“milk” and other dairy specific terms in names, labels, and 
advertisements for substitute products. Additionally, to prevent 
manufacturers of dairy substitute products from misusing 
“milk,” the FDA should encourage consumers and regulated 
parties to take an active role in product regulation. To 
participate, consumers should be able to file lawsuits against 
infringing parties and bring complaints to the FDA directly, as 
is the case in the current regulatory scheme. 
Big dairy and its supporters will likely argue that 
consumers’ lawsuits have historically proven to be ineffective 
and that a solution based primarily at regulating packaging and 
labels is an insufficient means of protecting consumers.160 This 
argument, however, lacks merit and should not dissuade the 
FDA from pursuing the proposed regulatory agenda. The failure 
of previous lawsuits likely does not indicate a fundamental 
problem with this system, but rather demonstrates that 
alternative milk product names and labels are sufficiently clear 
so as not to mislead a reasonable consumer, or in the words of 
one federal judge “even the least discerning of consumers.”161 
It must be conceded that no alteration to the current 
regulatory landscape, or even the perpetuation thereof, exists 
without added costs. Before the FDA reaches a final ruling on 
important final or proposed regulations, it conducts an economic 
analysis, which includes “an assessment of the costs, benefits, and 
cost-effectiveness of the action, as well as assessments of the costs, 
benefits and cost-effectiveness of the most promising alternative 
actions.”162 Thus, the FDA must expend time and financial 
resources to create, examine, and ultimately reach a conclusion on 
how and whether a regulation should proceed.163 Further, the 
dispute over use of “milk” impacts a multitude of interest groups, 
manufacturers, and products, making the requisite analysis much 
broader than that which was required in the context of the “Mayo 
Wars.”164 The possible market impact will probably meet the 
standard of importance to trigger an economic analysis, and as 
 
 160 See e.g., Ang v. WhiteWave Foods Co., No. 13-CV-1953, 2013 WL 6492353, 
at *1, 4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013). 
 161 Id. at *4. 
 162 Economic Impact Analyses of FDA Regulations, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMIN. (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/
EconomicAnalyses/ [https://perma.cc/S847-USL4]; see also Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 
Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 30, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 14 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011); 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994). 
 163 See Economic Impact Analyses of FDA Regulations, supra note 162. 
 164 The Dairy & Dairy Alternatives Market, PACKAGED FACTS (2018), 
https://www.packagedfacts.com/Content/Featured-Markets/Dairy-and-Dairy-Alternatives 
[https://perma.cc/XQA4-LGPR] (demonstrating the extensiveness of the dairy and plant-
based alternatives industries). 
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such, will likely require that the FDA invest substantial resources 
before it can bring a conclusion to the abiding conflict.165 
While the cost of completing an economic analysis will 
likely be substantial, this initial expenditure should not 
dissuade the agency from issuing guidance and bringing the 
conflict over use of the term “milk” to an end.166 If the FDA fails 
to act, the present dispute may linger indefinitely, which could 
lead to continued uncertainty and increased costs for producers, 
manufacturers, and consumers.167 
CONCLUSION 
The decreasing demand for dairy products and 
proliferation of substitute items created an atmosphere in which 
a war over the use of the word “milk” has persisted across 
decades. The twenty-year debate between the dairy and plant-
based alternative industries may, however, be heading toward 
an apparent end. If the DAIRY PRIDE Act passes Congress, it 
is unlikely it will withstand judicial scrutiny under the four-part 
test articulated in Central Hudson.  
There are less restrictive and constitutionally viable 
means the FDA could use to regulate “milk.” One such example 
would be to enact a solution similar to that which the regulatory 
agency used when resolving the “mayo wars” conflict—requiring 
more conspicuous labeling.168 Yet, a question remains: Is any of 
this regulation really necessary? Consumers today can bring 
action against manufacturers for misleading labels. The lack of 
 
 165 It does not appear that the FDA conducted an economic analysis in reaching 
its decision on the dispute over use of the term mayonnaise, likely because it did not 
center around an important proposed or final FDA regulation. The requirement that 
regulators conduct a cost-benefit analysis extends exclusively to regulations, and as such 
would not have been considered in the “mayo wars” because that case ended in 
settlement. See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017); Exec. Order 
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994). 
 166 While the FDA’s policy of inaction may be the result of a general apathy toward 
the issue, there may be other explanations for the executive agency’s seemingly dismissive 
behavior. For example, since the passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act in 1992, a 
significant portion of FDA funding comes directly from pharmaceutical companies, which 
in all likelihood has an effect on the alignment of the agency’s priorities. Prescription Drug 
User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 379g); see also Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments (PDUFA), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/Prescription
DrugUserFee/default.htm [https://perma.cc/93Y6-R29Y]. 
 167 See, e.g., AC Shilton, The Battle Over the Word ‘Milk,’ OUTSIDE (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.outsideonline.com/2152336/should-nut-milk-be-considered-milk [https://perma.cc/
BZ7R-ZVV6] (explaining the consequences “banning [ ]  use [of the term ‘milk’] from nondairy 
products could severely impact plant-based products”). But see St. Pierre, supra note 23 (Canada 
banned plant-based products from using “milk” in product names in 2009, but purchase of dairy 
products has continued to decline.). 
 168 See, e.g., Kowitt, supra note 153. 
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success of suits challenging use of “milk” to date likely does not 
indicate a fundamental problem with this system, but rather 
shows that alternative milk product names and labels are 
sufficiently clear so as not to mislead a reasonable consumer.169 
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